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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
tice, the "Feinberg rule" was no longer followed by the courts within
the Second Circuit.165 However, an examination of recent decisions
within the circuit reveals a more clouded picture. Earlier this year, in
United States v. Coblentz,16 6 the court reiterated the single preponder-
ance of evidence standard as controlling within the circuit and refused
to apply any other test for the submission of a case to the jury. How-
ever, many Second Circuit cases do reflect an abandonment of the single
test and an adoption of the majority rule,167 while other decisions
express doubt as to which standard should govern and, therefore, have
applied both.168
The effect of Taylor will be to clear up the confusion within this
circuit as to the standard of evidence necessary for submission of a
criminal case to a jury. While it has been stated that proof of a defen-
dant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is a basic proposition of our
law, the evidentiary rule within this circuit has been clearly inconsis-
tent with that concept.
Leaving Feinberg on the books thus creates a trap for districtjudges, a paper sword for prosecutors, and an unwarranted burden
upon criminal defendants'6 9
Having squarely confronted the problem, the Taylor court has re-
moved the trap.
AIRPORT SEARcHEs
United States v. Bell
In United States v. Bell17o the Second Circuit faced the task of
balancing the public danger posed by the current wave of airport hi-
165 Id. at 244.
166 453 F.2d 503 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 917 (1972).
167 See note 160 supra. These cases suggest that a complete abandonment of the
Feinberg rule had already been effected within this circuit. Contra, United States v.
Coblentz, 453 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1972).
168 See United States v. Leitner, 202 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), where the court
found that "[the] test of sufficiency of the evidence for the jury in a criminal prosecution
currently applicable within this circuit is not entirely free from doubt." Id. at 693. After
a discussion of the authority in support of each rule, the court found its decision sus-
tainable under either approach. In both United States v. Monica, 295 F.2d 400, 401
(2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 953 (1962), and United States v. lannelli, 461 F.2d
483, 486 n.4, (2d Cir. 1972), the court declined to decide which of the two standards to
apply and proceeded to apply both.
Finding the level of proof established by the prosecution in these cases to be suf-
ficient for the majority test enabled the courts to avoid the problem tackled in Taylor.
However, the effect of these decisions was to invoke the majority approach without
expressly overruling Feinberg since, in order to sustain a decision under both standards,
the stricter majority test would have to be met. Having passed this test, approval under
the Feinberg test would, of course, be automatic.
169 464 F.2d at 244 (emphasis added).
170 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972).
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jackings 71 against the threat of intrusions upon individual privacy.172
Rather than state a broad rule, the court preferred to hand down a
narrow decision limited to the particular facts before it. The court
found four circumstances present to support its holding that a federal
marshal's frisk of Henry Bell, an airline passenger, constituted a rea-
sonable search under the fourth amendment. 73 First, the marshal
171 The first skyjacking occurred in 1931 during a revolution in Peru when a group
of soldiers captured a Panagra airliner. The first case of skyjacking in the United States
took place aboard a National Airlines plane bound from Miami to Key West. The
hijacker rerouted the plane to land in Cuba. Before the year was out, four more
American planes were seized by air pirates. Over the next six years there were only
seven cases of skyjacking in the United States. Inexplicably, in 1968, 22 planes were sky-
jacked and during the following year, the number soared to 40. SATuRDAY REvIEw, Aug.
26, 1972, at 47-48. In 1970 skyjackings decreased approximately 50 per cent from the
level of the prior year, perhaps due to implementation of the federal anti-hijacking sys-
tem. No flight fully protected by this program had been hijacked. United States v. Lopez,
328 F. Supp. 1077, 1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
A stunning new element was added to the repertoire of the skyjacker in November
of 1971. Previously, skyjackers managed only to delay or change the destination of the
planes they seized in the United States, but now they began to demand huge ransoms
as well. SATuRDAY REvmw, Aug. 26, 1972, at 48-49. In addition, many hijackers have
recently attempted escapes by parachute. Benjamin Davis, head of the Department of
Transportation's anti-skyjacking effort, has stated:
We have a whole new baligame. It is essentially more violent and dangerous
than the old one. Extortion on top of hijacking is adding dangers. There are
more complications rounding up the money and parachutes.
Id. at 51.
Nearly twenty skyjackings have involved extortion as of July, 1972. Id.
172 See United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1972):
The reasonableness of any search must be determined by balancing the gov-
ernmental interest in searching against the invasion of privacy which the search
entails.
173 Under the fourth amendment, a search warrant should be obtained, whenever
practicable, from a neutral and detached magistrate. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
20 (1968); People v. Marshal, 69 Cal. 2d 51, 442 P. 2d 665, 69 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1968). This
requirement exists to assure a citizen of a deliberate and impartial judgment interposed
between him and the police. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963).
Many critics feel that the current practice used to obtain a warrant is a far cry from the
above ideal. See LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judges Role in Making
and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 Mcsr. L. REv. 987, 992 (1965) stating that
there is a lack of meaning in obtaining a warrant in large urban areas because judges,
too often, will sign warants automatically; Miller and Tiffany, Prosecutor Dominance
of the Warrant Decision: A Study of Current Practice, 1964 WAsn. U.L.Q. 1, 13 stating:
Traditionally magistrates have been laymen who might feel a certain diffidence
in disputing the essentially legal conclusions reached by law-trained persons.
Whether lawyers or laymen, magistrates do not have the investigational facilities
available to prosecutors.
A frisk of an airline passenger about to board a plane clearly precludes the ob-
taining of a warrant due to the "exigencies of time" inherent in such a situation.
United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d at 673. See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077
(E.D.N.Y. 1971) which held that an airport hijacking search could only be justified
under the protective frisk for weapons authorized by Terry v. Ohio since such a search
was not incident to a lawful arrest nor did it fit within any of the other exceptions to
the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. These exceptions are as follows:
If the subject consents to the search it is not unlawful without a warrant. See Zap v.
United States, 328 US. 624, 628 (1946). Cf. Comment, Airport Security Searches and the
1972]
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knew that Bell fitted the profile developed by the Federal Aviation
Agency to identify potential hijackers; 174 second, Bell had activated
a mechanical device known as a magnetometer used to detect the
Fourth Amendment, 71 COLUtm. L. REV. 1039 (1971) [hereinafter Airport Security] which
states that mere acquiescence does not establish consent. See also United States v. Lopez,
328 F. Supp. 1077, which points out that:
Consent to a search involves a relinquishment of fundamental constitutional
rights and should not be lightly inferred.
Id. at 1092; United States v. Smith, 308 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 906
(1963):
A consent is not a voluntary one if it is the product of duress or coercion,
actual or implied. Moreover, to be voluntary, a consent must have been un-
equivocal, specific and intelligently given.
Id. at 663; Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (consent is not given by a
suspect held in custody who tells the police that he does not mind if they search his
house); United States v. Lewis, 274 F. Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (if the consentor is
subject to physical restriction by the officers his consent may not be valid); Airport
Security at 1048-49 n.55, stating that:
In some courts at least, even assuming some form of waiver is recognized, failure
to advise ... of ... Fourth Amendment rights will bar a prosecution claim of
consent.
If there is an emergency a warrant is not needed. See United States v. Jeffers, 342
U.S. 48, 52 (1951); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948).
Nor is a warrant needed when the situation involves evidence obtained through hot
pursuit of fleeing felons, Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 615 (1963); the seizure
of evidence about to be destroyed, McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. at 455; about
to be removed, United States v. Jeffers, 342 US. at 52; lying in plain sight, Harris v.
United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
174 The Federal Aviation Agency profile is a misnomer. The profile was actually
developed through the efforts of a joint task force consisting of representatives of the
Justice and Commerce Departments as well as the Federal Aeronautics Administration.
Individuals trained in several disciplines, including psychology, law, engineering and
administration, participated. The group undertook a detailed study of the characteristics
of all known hijackers and of the air traveling public. Background investigations of
hijackers, together with visual and photographic studies of boarding passengers, were
relied upon. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. at 1082.
Were even one characteristic of the profile revealed to the general public, its use-
fulness could be undermined by hijackers fabricating an acceptable profile. Because
of this danger, courts have held in camera pre-trial hearings, excluding the public and
the defendant from the courtroom when testimony revealing the specific characteristics
of the profile is given. This practice has raised a serious constitutional question, i.e., a
defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him. The Second Circuit, in the
instant case, upheld the in camera procedure. The following factors were noted in support
of this judgment:
(1) the extra judicial statement of the unavailable witness which "normally in-
vokes the invocation of the confrontation guarantee" was not at issue. De-
fendant's attorney was present to question the witness.
(2) the in camera testimony bore no relationship to the question of Bell's guilt
or innocence of the crime charged.
(3) at a preliminary hearing, the accused is not given many of the same safe-
guards which are given him on trial. For example, hearsay evidence is ad-
missible at a suppression hearing and the concealment of an informant's
identity at such hearing has been upheld by the Supreme Court in McCray
v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
(4) the continuing presence of the defendant even at his own trial is not an
absolute right. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) (waiver); Il-
linois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (disruptive courtroom behavior made
defendant's removal necessary).
For an excellent discussion of the informer analogy applied in the context of an
[Vol. 47:250
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presence of a weapon upon a person; 175 third, Bell had no personal
identification; and fourth, he voluntarily told the marshal he was re-
leased on bail pending prosecution for narcotics and attempted murder.
Relying on Terry v. Ohio,"'6 the court, in upholding the marshal's
search as reasonable did not require a showing of probable cause." 7 In
Terry the Supreme Court upheld a stop and frisk by a trained police
officer who had a reasonable belief that a suspect carried a weapon
which would endanger himself or others.178 In the present case, the
airport hijacking, see Judge Weinstein's opinion in United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp.
at 1090-92 which concludes:
The instant case actually presents a stronger case for non-disclosure to the
defendant because the informant is an objective system, not an individual who
might be known to the defendant. He could not, by his presence, hope to impugn
its credibility. Furthermore, since the level of probability required to justify a
frisk is lower than "probable cause" there is a corresponding lower necessity
for disclosure.
17 The magnetometer is an electronic weapons detector which can be activated by
a variety of metallic objects. Approximately fifty per cent of the persons who pass
through such a device trigger its warning signal. However, the magnetometer retains
its usefulness since it is only one of a series of steps utilized by the present anti-hijacking
system. The total system, the main focus of which is on deterrence, consists of the
following elements:
I.) heavy penalties
2.) notice to the public
3.) use of a passenger profile
4.) magnetometer
5.) interview by airline personnel
6.) interview by marshal
7.) frisk
See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. at 1083, for a description of how these elements
interact.
176392 U.S. 1 (1968).
177 Airport hijacking cases have invariably relied upon the Terry precedent to uphold
warrantless searches without probable cause. See, e.g., United States v. Epperson, 454
F.2d 769; United States v. Lindsey, 451 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Lopez,
328 F. Supp. 1077.
178 In the Terry decision, the reasonable belief that the suspects were armed was
based upon the officer's personal observation that they were contemplating an armed
robbery. 392 U.S. at 28. This belief was nurtured by the conduct of the suspects, i.e., their
casual and oft-repeated reconnaissance of a store window.
Several subsequent cases have relied upon the Terry precedent to uphold investi-
gative "seizures of the person" or protective frisks. In some cases, frisks resulted from
information furnished by unknown informers. See, e.g., United States v. Sims, 450 F.2d
261 (4th Cir. 1971) (police discovered weapon upon suspect's person after an anonymous
caller told the police he was forced at gunpoint to drive the suspect to the airport);
United States v. Unverzagt, 424 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1970) (postal authorities "seized" the
suspect by ordering him to step out of a men's washroom); Ballou v. Massachusetts, 403
F.2d 982 (1st Cir. 1968) (unknown informer's tip that suspect was armed, coupled with
police officer's knowledge that suspect had served time on a gun carrying charge and
was presently involved in a gangland feud, justified a frisk).
While a showing of probable cause is not required for an investigative "stop" or
frisk for weapons, an
[unknown informant's] tip must be linked to other facts known by the police...
to create the pre-requisite reasonable suspicion....
Ballou v. Massachusetts, 403 F.2d at 986. Cf. United States v. Bell, 457 F.2d 1231, 1238
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reasonable belief of the officer was based upon the objective results of
the profile and the magnetometer 79 coupled with an admission of prior
criminal behavior while the danger to others posed by a potential hi-
jacker was self-evident, 180
Bell's significance lies in the court's conclusion that, in order to
counteract the dangers of hijacking, an officer is permitted to go beyond
the frisk even in situations where he does not feel an object which is
the approximate size and shape of a gun or knife. By allowing the
(5th Cir. 1972), holding that absent establishment of the reliability of the informer,
investigations "may not reflect anything more than idle rumor or irresponsible conjecture."
It is difficult to discern any notable difference between the evidence required to
establish probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant and that necessary to
sustain a policeman's frisk in light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971). The Court held that an averment of previous reliability
was not necessary when a supporting affidavit disclosed personal and recent observations
of criminal activity by an informant known to the police but unknown to the magistrate.
Many cases have dealt with investigations and protective searches of automobile
drivers and occupants in the wake of the Terry decision. See, e.g., United States v. Jack-
son, 448 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1971) (upheld investigation of three Negroes in a car based
upon report that a nearby liquor store had been robbed by two Negroes. Police thought
the third suspect could have been a lookout); United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189
(9th Cir. 1971) (upheld frisk of passengers where the police had antecedent reasons to
suspect the driver was armed); United States v. Davis, 441 F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1971)
(barred evidence resulting from a protective search made after the suspect had committed
three traffic violations); United States v. Collins, 439 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (barred
evidence resulting from a search made in response to furtive gestures by passengers of
a car); United States v. Harflinger, 436 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1970) (upheld the investigation
and search of suspects who were driving in the early morning hours with non-local
license plates in such a fashion that they appeared to be reconnoitering); Carpenter v.
Sigler, 419 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1969) (upheld search upon similar facts). Compare United
States v. Marshall, 440 F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 909 (1970) with United
States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1971). See generally LaFave, "Street Encounters"
and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters & Beyond, 67 MICH. L. Rrv. 40 (1968).
179 Compare this situation with searches conducted as the result of an informant's
tip. See cases cited in note 9 supra.
180 Congress was aroused as early as 1961 by the first wave of American hijackings.
See 107 CONG. REC. 14475-78 (Aug, 3, 1961). A new law was swiftly enacted to create the
federal crime of "air piracy" whether or not the flight crossed state lines or the offense
took place over the high seas. This legislation also punished attempts to commit air
piracy, interference with flight crew members or flight attendants and the carrying of
weapons aboard aircraft. Pub. L. 87-197, 75 Stat. 466 (Sept. 5, 1961) codified in 49 U.S.C.
§ 1472 (1970). See United States v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 415 (W.D. Tex. 1969), where
defendant was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon while attempting to board an
aircraft in violation of 49 U.S.C. § 1472 (1). The court quite broadly construed an at-
tempt to board an aircraft to encompass mere surrender of the airline ticket at the
customer service desk and the subsequent entry into the departure lounge for the flight
covered by that ticket.
This attempt by Congress to define a precise offense and prescribe stiff uniform
penalties has failed both as a deterrent to potential hijackers and as an effective tool
of law enforcement. In the period 1961-1971 there have been 117 incidents involving
aircraft of United States registry. Thirty-two individuals have been brought to trial in
federal court in the United States in connection with hijacking of United States air-
planes while ninety-two persons are listed as fugitives. LOWENFEm, AVITON LAW, ch. 7,
at 21-22 (1972). See generally Volpi &c Stewart, Aircraft Hijachings: Some Domestic and
International Responses, 59 Ky. L.J. 273 (1971).
[Vol. 47:250
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE
officer to further examine an object that felt like "hard lumps" in a pat
down, on the ground that it could be gunpowder or some other explo-
sive,""' the Second Circuit has sanctioned a broader search after a frisk
since any object within a pocket could be an explosive. The decision
in Bell carved out an exception to the Second Circuit's interpretation
of the Terry rule in situations involving airport security while leaving
untouched the restrictions upon which the scope of the search in the
traditional setting of a street encounter between police officer and
suspect. This was indicated when only two weeks subsequent to the
Bell case, in United States v. Del Toro, 82 the court held that a ten
dollar bill folded to a size of two inches by three-quarters of an inch
containing 2.2 grams of cocaine could not reasonably have aroused the
suspicion of a weapon when such an object was discovered in the
handkerchief pocket of a suit.8 8
The Del Toro case illustrates that the Terry rule is composed of
two distinct requirements: first, the initial frisk must be reasonable
under the circumstances; and second, the pat down must be limited in
scope to a search for weapons.284 The Bell decision clearly expands the
181 464 F.2d at 674.
182 464 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1972).
183 Id. at 521. A conceptual problem in formulating a rule for frisks is that the
policeman, assuming his good faith, acts subjectively based upon his own immediate
sense of risk to himself and others around him while the court testing his action for
purposes of admissibility, uses an objective standard - what a reasonably prudent
policeman in his position would do. The deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is
questionable since a policeman must act instinctively when he encounters a suspect.
On the other hand, an objective rule "provides some insurance against dishonesty by
the policeman who does not in fact have reason to suspect that the suspect is armed,
but who would be willing to fabricate his remembered emotions to validate a productive
frisk." United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. at 1096. This watchdog role of the courts is
of much significance because of the rule that a proper frisk permits seizure of non-
weapon contraband.
Judge Moore, in his dissenting opinion in the Del Toro case, sharply criticizes the
objective approach taken by the court:
Here is another illustration ... of an appellate court, writing in the comparative
safety of its chambers, telling an experienced Federal Narcotics Agent what his
subjective reaction should have been when the Agent, during a legitimate
"frisk," discovered an object in the pocket of a companion of a just-arrested
drug dealer. It was the Agent's concern as to the object and at that time, not
months later on a suppression hearing, that should be the relevant focus of our
inquiry.
464 F.2d at 523.
184This distinction is apparent since Del Toro held that a pat down for weapons
was justified under the circumstances while it simultaneously stated that a limited search
for weapons had degenerated into an unrelated and unreasonable search for evidence.
One hijacking search case has also adopted the two-step reasoning process implemented
in Terry:
The interests must be balanced at two stages: the search must be justified at
its inception and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place.
United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d at 771.
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permissible scope of a frisk for weapons but narrowly confines such an
extension to situations involving airport security.
Chief Judge Friendly and Judge Mansfield wrote sharply diver-
gent concurring opinions which discussed the first Terry requirement,
i.e., that a frisk for weapons must be reasonable under the circum-
stances, an issue narrowly decided in the main opinion. Although both
judges ostensibly agreed that the test of reasonableness required a
weighing of the private harm against the public need for a search, they
differed as to how to strike the balance.185
Judge Friendly, after noting that the criminal activity in Terry
involved the burglary of a single store concluded:
When the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and
millions of dollars of property inherent in the pirating . .. of a
large airplane, the danger alone meets the test of reasonableness. 86
Judge Mulligan, as the author of the Bell opinion, has correctly recognized that an
airline weapons frisk is unlikely to degenerate into an unrelated search for evidence
of other crimes. A federal marshal would be unfaithful to his duty if he failed to check
for explosive devices after his suspicions were aroused. See United States v. Sims, 450
F.2d at 263 (upheld seizure of an attache case after suspect was arrested for carrying a
gun at an airport). But see N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1972 at -, col. 1, which reports a federal
district judge's ruling in California that evidence of another crime found in an anti-
hijacking search is inadmissible unless the passenger is informed that he can refuse to
be searched.
185 See Player, Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 5 Gao. L. Rxv. 269 (1971) defining
balancing as follows:
Many factors would be taken into account including the seriousness of the
offence, the absolute need to conduct this type of investigation, the nature of
the locale, activities of the suspect, the danger to the public if immediate
action is not taken, the nature and length of detection, and the harm to the
suspect.
Id. at 277.
See also LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters & Be-
yond, 67 MicH. L. REv. 40, 57 (1968) which emphasizes the seriousness of the offense. But see
H. Schwartz, Stop and Frisk - A Case Study in Judicial Control of the Police, 58 J.
Cam. L.C. & P.S. 43 (1967) fearing that:
Ml~f the policeman's "balancing" turns out to produce evidence of crime how
many courts will be ready to find that he balanced wrongly . .. ?
Id. at 448.
See United States v. Davis, 441 F.2d at 31 (Trask, J,, dissenting), approving a police-
man's cursory search of every person he stopped on the ground that the officer thought it
necessary to his personal safety.
188 464 F.2d at 675.
Judge Friendly would impose three requirements upon an airline weapons search:
(1) good faith
(2) reasonable scope(3) advance notice to passengers that they will be searched to enable them to avoid
the search by choosing not to travel by air.
Cf. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. at 1093:
Nor can the government properly argue that it can condition the exercise of the
defendant's constitutional right to travel on the voluntary relinquishment of
his Fourth Amendment rights. Implied consent under such circumstances would
be inherently coercive. (citations omitted).
[Vol. 47:250
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This view would allow a weapons search of all airline passengers and
their baggage'87 and would consider the use of a hijacker profile and
magnetometer test as a "self-imposed expedient" rather than a neces-
sary element to legitimize a particular search. Thus, since all passengers
can be searched, a fortiori no constitutional barrier prevents searching
only certain ones based upon "trained intuition."'88 In his closing
argument, Judge Friendly urged courts to
say nothing that would create doubt concerning the legality of
wider or less precise measures when and if these should prove to be
needed.189
Judge Mansfield, on the other hand, rejects a broad search of all
passengers and would require "grounds for suspecting that the pas-
See Airport Security, at 1049, stating that passage cannot be conditioned upon surrender
of fourth amendment rights since
[i]t has been deemed improper to condition public assistance benefits, unem-
ployment compensation, tax exemptions, and public employment upon the sur-
render of constitutional guarantees (citations omitted).
187American Airlines and Trans World Airlines have announced that they will
soon begin inspecting the hand luggage of all boarding passengers in a new effort to
deter hijacking. They will become the nation's first airlines, other than shuttle lines,
to search the purses, briefcases and packages of every passenger. Airline sources said
that recent market surveys had shown that hijacking jitters were having a measurable
effect on the nation's air traffic. N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1972, at 1, col. 5. This announce-
ment, together with spot checks and other security measures previously in effect, will
mean that about 175,000 of the nation's 500,000 average daily passenger volume will be
subjected to searches of their carry-on baggage and in most cases to an electronic search
of their person. American Airlines estimated that the new security measures would cost
it more than $2 million annually in extra manpower expenses. Industry spokesmen said
previous experience had indicated that most passengers did not object to the delays
if the searches meant better security. Id. at 73, col. 7, 8.
The Federal Aviation Agency's anti-hijacking program, had, until recently proven
highly successful. See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. at 1084; United States v.
Bell, 464 F.2d at 676 (fansfield, J., concurring). Yet the major criticism of the program
is that the airlines are not compelled by law to search passengers and their baggage.
SATURDAY REvmv, Aug. 26, 1972, at 52, col. 2. See also N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1972, at 32,
col. 2 (editorial):
These are not just services which responsible airlines should provide. They are
basic precautions which air travelers have every right to insist upon.
This criticism was met by a government announcement that beginning January 5, 1973,
airlines would have to inspect all carry on luggage and screen every passenger. local
policemen rather than federal marshals will enforce these new measures. N.Y. Times,
Dec. 11, 1972, at -, col. 1.
It could be argued that an airport search conducted by airline rather than govern-
ment personnel is not restricted by the fourth amendment guarantees. The new mea-
sures instituted by American and Trans World Airlines may bring this issue to the fore.
The requirements of the fourth amendment could reach the airlines through the govern.
ment's commercial aviation involvement. Some examples are the leasing of land to the
airports, regulation of rates, assignment of flight patterns and the close cooperation
between airport personnel and federal marshals in implementing the anti-hijacking
programs. See Airport Security at 1044-45. But cf. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465,
475 (1921).
188 See United States v. Lindsey, 451 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1971).
189 464 F,9d at 675 (Friendly, j., concurring).
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sengers searched are potential hijackers." 190 He reasons that if a
"public-danger-alone" test is substituted for traditional fourth amend-
ment standards in airport searches, an erosion of individual rights
would be likely to result since this rationale could be extended to
searches of persons or homes in high crime areas. 191 Judge Mansfield
clearly feels that the judicial branch should react calmly in the face
of new threats to the public and he notes that
the ultimate strength of our constitutional guarantees lies in their
unhesitating application in times of crisis and tranquility alike.192
Underlying Judge Mansfield's argument is his feeling that the hijacking
problem will not require any greater deterrent than a wider applica-
tion of the present anti-hijacking system 93
190 Id. (Mansfield, J., concurring). Judge Mansfield's view was adopted in an earlier
airport weapons search decision. See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, where
the court felt the issue was whether the Federal Aviation Agency's screening procedure
produces sufficient information to justify a cursory weapons search. The Lopez decision
offered the following dictum:
Even the use of the magnetometer might be an objectionable intrusion where
it not accompanied by an antecedent warning from the profile indicating a need
to focus particular attention on the subject. We do not now decide whether, in
absence of some prior indication of danger, the government may validly require
any citizen to pass through an electronic device which probes beneath his cloth-
ing and effects to reveal what he carries with him.
Id. at 1100.
191 464 F.2d at 675-76.
192 Id. at 676.
193Three distinct deterrent efforts have been undertaken to control aircraft hi-
jackings. One attempted solution has made use of sky marshals and other in-flight
security measures. This program was enacted in response to the events of Sept. 6, 1970,
when four jets bound for New York with more than six hundred passengers aboard
were hijacked over Europe by an Arab guerrilla group. N.Y. Times Sept. 7, 1970, at 1,
col. 4. President Nixon announced that 1800 armed agents travelling incognito would
be placed aboard airliners that flew the routes that had proved most vulnerable to
skyjacking in the past. This $30 million federal program did not prevent twenty-seven
skyjackings during the following year - the same number that had occurred over the
previous twelve month period when there were no sky marshals. In one instance, a sky
marshal was aboard a hijacked airliner but he took no action for fear of endangering
the life of a hostage. The sky marshal program has been cut back by transferring many
marshals to ground security positions. SATURDAY REviEw, Aug. 26, 1972 at 51-52. See
also AvIATION WFEK AND SPAcE TE CNOLOGY, Sept. 28, 1970 at 26; Id. Nov. 9, 1970 at 29;
35 Fed. Reg. 14839 (Sept. 24, 1970) issuing 14 CF.R. § 224.2a (background information
concerning the sky marshal program).
A second approach to the skyjacking problem seeks an international treaty to provide
for the punishment or prompt extradition of all air pirates. The United States and Canada
this summer drafted a treaty under which signatory nations would collectively halt com-
mercial air service to any country that did not punish or extradite hijackers, or did not
promptly release hijacked planes, crewmen and passengers. Delegates to a seventeen nation
air conference rejected this proposal. France and Great Britain resisted this proposal
because it amounts to a fundamental departure from current standards of international
law on the matter of sanctions. In addition, both countries have economic interests in the
Middle East which might be adversely affected by such a treaty. The Soviet Union opposed
the treaty by arguing that joint sanctions should be imposed only by the United Nations
Security Council. Evidently, the Soviet Union is unwilling to relinquish its sovereignty
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While no circuit court has specifically decided whether a frisk of all
passengers is constitutionally permissible,'94 precedent does exist for
Judge Friendly's view that a search of some airline passengers can be
based on nothing more than an experienced officer's intuition. In United
States v. Lindsey,195 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that defen-
dant's use of four different names, his anxious behavior, and the appar-
ent presence of a hard object in his coat pocket provided a sufficient
basis for a federal marshal to stop and frisk the defendant. Applying
Terry to these facts, the Third Circuit stated:
In the context of a possible airplane hijacking with the enormous
over this matter. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1972 at 91, col. 3. For an excellent discussion of
some of the problems faced in drafting an international hijacking treaty, see LOwENrIELD,
AvIArsoN LAW ch. 7 at 16-18 (1972). For a discussion of the unilateral action taken by the
United States to provide for the punishment of skyjackers, see note 11 supra.
A third response to the hijacking problem seeks to prevent potential hijackers from
bringing weapons aboard the aircraft they plan to seize. The Federal Aviation Anti-
Hijacking program was designed to attain this objective. This program, however, has two
vital weaknesses; first, it is necessarily limited to aircraft boardings within the United
States and second, there is neither sufficient money nor manpower available to fully imple-
ment the program.
The Senate recently passed a bill which authorized $35 million dollars a year for a
new airport security force to screen all passengers and carry-on luggage S. 2280, 92 Cong.,
2d Sess. (1972), White House lobbying succeeded in getting the House Committee to
drop these screening provisions from its bill. The administration feels that local law en-
forcement agencies and airlines should be responsible for detecting potential skyjackers.
NmVSDAY, Sept. 29, 1972, at 60 (editorial). Until early 1972,.the F.A.A. anti-hijacking
program was voluntary. All airlines protected some flights but none protected all. Follow-
ing one apparently successful and several unsuccessful attempts by hijackers to extort
money and then parachute from the plane, the F.A.A. issued an emergency rule requiring
all air carriers to implement the system, 14 C.F.R. § 121.538 (issued Jan. 31, 1972), 37 Fed.
Reg. 2500, Feb. 2, 1972.
Critics inaccurately complain that the airlines are not compelled by law to conduct
airport searches. See, e.g., SATuRDAY RPviwm, Aug. 26, 1972 at 52. The important question
is whether the Federal anti-hijacking system is an effective deterrent against hijackings
which may occur on planes boarded by passengers in the United States since this method
of deterrence cannot affect flights which originate outside the United States even if they
are made by planes under American registry.
As of September 1972, twenty-five airliners from thirteen countries have been success-
fully hijacked this year, resulting in the deaths of 140 passengers and crew members.
NmvsDAY, Sept. 29, 1972, at 60 (editorial). It must be determined which, if any, of these
hijackings could have been prevented by unilateral American action. Only after such an
analysis is made, could it be said that greater deterrent efforts are needed on the
national level. Whether the government or the airlines should bear the major burden of
either the present or future deterrent efforts is a separate issue.
1 4 Cf. United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972), where the court upheld
a search of the defendant's jacket based upon the activation of the magnetometer alone.
Epperson might be read broadly as justifying a search of all passengers but its language
indicates otherwise:
The use of the device, [magnetometer] unlike frisking cannot possibly be an annoy-
ing, frightening and perhaps humiliating experience.
Id. at 771.
The marshal's frisk was reasonable only after Epperson had activated the magneto-
meter, removed certain objects from his pocket and once again triggered the device.
195 451 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1971).
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consequences which may flow there-from, and in view of the
limited time [the marshal] had to act, the level of suspicion re-
quired for a Terry investigative stop and protective search should
be lowered.196
Judge Mansfield's concern for the traditional standards of the
fourth amendment may be misplaced in view of the variable nature
of that amendment's standard of reasonableness. While probable cause
and a search warrant are often required for a search not incident to a
valid arrest, several exceptions to this general rule do, in fact, exist.
Judicially sanctioned statutes'9 7 give customs agents and officials broad
authority to search without a warrant and the Second Circuit itself has
held that "mere suspicion of illegal activity within their jurisdiction is
enough 'cause' to permit a customs officer to stop and search a per-
son." 198 This boarder search exception was developed to assist in ex-
cluding contraband from entering the country and, unlike the newly
emerging problem of airport hijackings, the customs search rule is
based on practical and historical considerations which antedate adop-
tion of the constitutional amendments. 199 However, Judge Weinstein,
of the Eastern District of New York, has carefully limited the border
search exception to imported goods and persons entering the country
while retaining the probable cause requirement for exit searches.200
1961d. at 703.
19719 U.S.C. § 482 (stop, search, and examine any vehicle, beast or person, on which
or whom he or they shall suspect there is merchandise which is subject to duty, or shall
have been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law); 19 U.S.C.
§ 1496 (examination of the baggage of any person arriving in the United States); 19 U.S.C.
§ 1499 (inspection, examination and appraisal of imported merchandise); 19 U.S.C. § 1582
(search by authorized officers or agents of all persons coming into the United States); 19
U.S.C. § 1581 (boarding of any vessel or vehicle at any place and search any cargo on
board).
Several cases have upheld and interpreted the border search exception provided by
the statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1121 (1969); Thomas v. United States, 372 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1967); Alexander v.
United States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977 (1966); Landau v. United
States Attorney, 82 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 665 (1936).
198 United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d at 12.
199 Border searches were authorized by the Judiciary Act of July 31, 1789, 1 Stat. 29,
43, which permitted customs officers:
To enter any ship or vessel in which they shall have reason to suspect any goods
... subject to duty shall be concealed; and therein to search for, seize, an secure
any such goods.
See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), which points out that since the Judiciary
Act of 1789
was passed by the same Congress which proposed for adoption the original amend-
ments to the Constitution it is clear that the members of that body did not regard
search and seizure of this kind as unreasonable and they are not embraced within
the prohibition of the [fourth] amendment.
Id. at 623.
200 United States v. Marti, 327 F. Supp. 59 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
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The only reasonable explanation for such a distinction is that the
public danger is greater in the former circumstance. One can argue by
analogy that the potential harm to the public, coupled with the damage
threatened to a billion dollar industry, requires a low level of a suspi-
cion akin to trained intuition be adopted as the proper fourth amend-
ment standard to meet the unique situation.
A frisk of all airline passengers, however, is more difficult to justify
because an officer's suspicion or trained intuition is not involved. One
circuit court has upheld an electronic weapons search of all pas-
sengers201 by reasoning that such an intrusion lacks the annoyance or
humiliation of a physical search. But an initial frisk of all passengers
without the prior use of a magnetometer to create an element of suspi-
cion is of doubtful constitutionality.20 2 Under the Terry rule, an officer
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts to justify the
limited intrusion of a frisk for weapons.203 The present anti-hijacking
system provides statistics which show the precise probabilities involved
when a suspect is frisked. A frisk of all passengers and their baggage, on
the other hand, is not even based upon an inarticulate hunch. An
extension of the Terry rule to allow a lower level of suspicion in air-
port weapons searches could not logically permit a search of all pas-
sengers.
A more satisfactory legal basis for upholding a search of all
passengers may be found by examining those cases which have upheld
area-wide inspection of dwellings.20 4 Such inspections are justified as
the only effective means of protecting the public health and safety.2 5
201 United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972), discussed in note 194 supra.
Cf. Katz v. United States, 289 U.S. 347 (1967) (electronic eavesdropping):
[The reach of [the fourth amendment] cannot turn upon the presence or absence
physical intrusion into any given enclosure.
Id. at 353.
202 Cf. Airport Security at 1057:
[W]hether [Terry] legitimizes the use of the magnetometer on all passengers is a
more difficult question. The personality profile is apparently of only limited ac-
curacy. Yet it does provide some marginal basis for reasonable suspicion. Thus,
unless it can be established that the protection of airline passengers and property
would be frustrated by a requirement that the use of the magnetometer be
limited to those passengers who are adjudged suspect based upon application of
the profile analysis, such a requirement may well be found constitutionally re-
quired....
203 392 U.S. at 21.
204 Camara v. Municipal Ct. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). In Camara, a
person was charged with a crime for his refusal to permit housing inspectors to enter his
leasehold without a warrant. The Court reversed his conviction by holding that he had a
constitutional right to insist that the inspectors obtain a warrant. In dictum, the Court
rejected the argument that warrants should issue only when the inspector possesses prob-
able cause to believe that a particular dwelling contains housing code violations.
205 Id. at 535-36.
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Similar to hijacking searches, these inspections are limited to a nar-
rowly defined class and are aimed at deterrence rather than evidence
gathering.20 Establishing a level of suspicion for a particular building
is unnecessary under this approach. If this analogy is accepted by the
courts, the government would be required to show that the present
anti-hijacking system is an unsatisfactory security measure before they
could introduce as evidence the fruits of the search of all passengers
and their baggage. In determining whether the government has met
this burden, courts could use congressional legislation as a guide. The
Senate has passed a measure declaring that
[tihe United States air transportation system continues to be vul-
nerable to violence and air piracy because of inadequate security
and a continuing failure to properly identify and arrest persons
attempting to violate Federal law relating to crimes against air
transportation.2 07
To remedy this situation, the bill authorizes government personnel to
search any person or property aboard or attempting to board an air-
craft. The bill also mandates the issuance of regulations requiring the
use of weapons detection devices upon all passengers and provide the
funds necessary for this purpose in recognition of the United States
government's primary responsibility to guarantee and insure safety to
the millions of passengers who use air transportation.
The House of Representatives has refused to include these provi-
sions in its bill, thereby weakening any inference which courts could
draw from legislation dealing with airport weapons searches.
While congressional legislation is a reaction to the dangers posed
by hijackings, courts must consider the dangers posed to individual
liberties by governmental invasions of privacy. Judge Friendly's
"danger alone" test ignores the latter consideration. The "danger
alone" rationale was used in the past to justify the internment of
Japanese-Americans during World War II. The "danger alone" ration-
ale has supported the tactic of mass arrests of young people to avoid
disruption of government business in Washington D.C. The test pro-
posed by Judge Friendly contains these unsavory connotations and
206 Id. at 537. The Court noted that:
A number of persuasive factors combine to support the reasonableness of area
code enforcement inspections. First, such programs have a long history of judicial
and public acceptance. Second, the public interest demands that all dangerous
conditions be prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful that any other canvassing
technique would achieve acceptable results .... Finally, because the inspections
are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime,
they involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy.
Id.
207 Air Transportation Security Act of 1972, S. 2280, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
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such language should be scrupulously avoided. On the other hand, a
constitutionally permissible search of all airline passengers may be a
desirable result. A decision which upholds the constitutionality of such
searches should stress the limited nature of the invasion of privacy.
Surveys have shown that most airline passengers, the class victim of
weapons searches, welcome them. Passengers feel that the minor in-
convenience of the search is outveighed by the assurance of a safe
flight.20 8 By employing a L ue balancing test which carefully considers
the consequences to the individual victims of a search as well as the
public danger, courts will not only achieve a desirable result but also
a satisfactory legal theory for reaching that result.
AUTHORIZATION OF WIRETAPS
United States v. Pisacano
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968209 legalized, within narrowly defined limits,210 wiretapping by
federal and state authorities in investigating certain types of crimes.2 11
Drawn to comply with constitutional standards enunciated in Berger
v. New York212 and Kutz v. United States,2 18 it provides that authoriza-
tion for the interception of wire or oral communications must be
granted by a federal judge of competent jurisdiction upon an applica-
tion authorized by "[t]he Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney
General specifically designated by the Attorney General."214 According
208 See N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1972, at 73, col. 7.
209 Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 211-223 (partially codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20
(1970)) [hereinafter Title III].
2 1 0 See 18 U.S.C. § 2516, 2518(1)-(8) (1970).
211 All crimes to which Title III is applicable are listed at 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)(a)-(g)
(1971).
212388 U.S. 41 (1967).
In Berger, a New York statute permitting eavesdropping was declared invalid for want
of "adequate judicial supervision or protective procedure." Id. at 60. Specifically, the
Court objected to the following facts: (1) the warrant required no particularity as to the
specific crime being investigated or anticipated; (2) prolonged eavesdropping would be
"equivalent to a series of intrusions ... pursuant to a single showing of probable cause;"
(3) no termination date for the authorization was required; (4) there was no requirement
for notice as is present in conventional warrants.
213 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Katz suggested that "[a] duly authorized magistrate . . . could constitutionally have
authorized, with appropriate safeguards, the very limited search and seizure that the
Government asserts in fact took place." Id. at 353 (emphasis added). The "limited search
and seizure" referred to was eavesdropping with the use of an electronic device placed on
the top of a public telephone booth regularly used by the defendant.
That the drafters of Title III had the Berqer and Katz decisions in mind is reflected
in the accompanying Senate report: "Title MI was drafted to meet these [constitutional]
standards and to conform-with Katz v. United States. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess., 2 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. Nzws, 2153 (1968).
214 18 U.S.C. § 2,516(l) (1970).
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